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Introduction
Legislation in many states authorizes adult
and juvenile courts to sentence offenders to
perform community service as a condition of
probation. Generally, such legislation permits local
governments (and in some cases, private agencies)
to use probationers in a variety of public service
jobs. Community service probationer programs
have generated questions about the liability
of local governments for injuries caused and
suffered by probationers performing work under
their supervision. State legislation governing that
liability is generally limited to the application of
tort liability and workers’ compensation laws to such
offenders. But 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is another possible
avenue of liability. This report will consider what
potential liabilities local governments in Tennessee
face when they use probationers to perform
community service.

Statutory Law Governing Community
Service by Probationers in Tennessee
Under Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.),
Title 41, Chapter 9, defendants eligible for
probation1 may be ordered to perform community
service as a condition of probation.2 Probationers
may be assigned to the Tennessee Department of
Correction (T.C.A. 41-9-101 et seq.) or to the county
probation department (T.C.A. 41-9-201 et seq.) to
perform approved community work projects. In
both cases, the local government is insulated from
liability for injuries suffered, or caused by, the

community service probationer while he or she
is performing community service work, if the
local government “exercised due care in the
protection and supervision of such probationer”
(T.C.A. 41-9-104 and 41-9-204).3 However,
that insulation is no greater than is already
provided local governments under the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act.

Local Government Tort Liability
for Injuries Caused by Community
Service Probationers
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
(TGTLA) stripped local government of immunity
from tort suits in several areas. Under that act,
local governments are now liable for injuries
arising from the negligent operation of motor
vehicles by their employees (T.C.A. 29-20-202),
unsafe streets and highways (T.C.A. 29-20-203),
dangerous structures (T.C.A. 29-20-204), and
the negligent acts or omissions of their employees
(except for injuries arising from the performance
of discretionary functions, false arrest and several
other intentional torts, issuance and revocation
of permits, inspections of property, judicial
and administrative prosecutions, employee
misrepresentations, riots and other disorders,
and the levy and collection of taxes)
(T.C.A. 29-20-205). The TGTLA provides that the act
is the exclusive route for a tort liability suit against
a local government (T.C.A. 29-20-101 et seq.).
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The most likely source of local government tort
liability for injuries caused by a community service
probationer is the negligent acts or omissions of
its employees (T.C.A. 29-20-205). But the local
government cannot be reached directly through
the conduct of the community service probationer
because the latter is not a local government
employee. The deﬁnition of “employee” in the
act provides that any person, other than an
elected or appointed ofﬁcial or member of a board,
is an employee if the person meets all of the
following requirements:
•
The governmental entity itself selected
the person in question to perform services;
•
The governmental entity is liable for the
payment of compensation for the
performance of such services, and the
person receives all of his compensation
directly from the payroll department of the
governmental entity;
•
The governmental entity provides the
person in question the same beneﬁts as
all other employees of the governmental
entity, including retirement beneﬁts
and the eligibility to participate in
insurance programs;
•
The person acts under the control and
direction of the governmental entity not
only as to the result to be accomplished
but as to the means and details by which
which the result is accomplished; and
•
The person is entitled to the same job
protection system and rules, such as
civil service or grievance procedures,
as are other persons employed by
the governmental entity
(T.C.A. 29-20-107(a)[1]-[5]).
That narrow deﬁnition appears to conclusively
exclude either adult or juvenile community service
probationers. It would be extremely difﬁcult for
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anyone claiming injury at the hands of a community
service probationer to show that an employeremployee relationship existed between the local
government and the community service probationer.
While local governments apply for the use of
probationers to perform community service, they
probably do not “select” them to perform services
within the meaning of the TGTLA; the selection
is done by the Tennessee Department of
Correction or the county probation department
(T.C.A. 41-9-104 and 41-9-204). In fact, as its
title implies and its contents make clear, the
Community Service Participation Agreement With
Supervising Agency (See Appendix A) which the local
government must sign as a condition to obtaining
probationers from the Department of Correction
to perform community service, imposes extensive
supervisory, but no selection, responsibilities on the
local government. There are no local governments
in Tennessee that compensate community service
probationers or provide them with the same
beneﬁts and job protection they provide to their
regular employees.
An even further limitation on the deﬁnition of an
employee for the purposes of the TGTLA permits
a local government to use and direct the labor of
community service probationers without the danger
of creating an employer-employee relationship.
T.C.A. 29-20-107(b) provides that:
A governmental entity’s reservation of the
right to approve employment or terminate
employment by any contract, agreement or
other means or such entity’s ability to control
or direct a person not otherwise in the regular
employ of such entity shall not operate to
make a person an employee of such entity for
the purpose of the immunity granted by this
chapter unless such person otherwise qualiﬁes
as an employee according to the provisions of
this section.
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However, the fact that community service
probationers are not employees within the meaning
of TGTLA should not lull local governments into a
false sense of security. Negligent acts and omissions
of local government employees for which local
governments are liable under that act undoubtedly
include negligent supervision. A person claiming
injury at the hands of a community service
probationer could sue the local government on
the grounds that the failure of the local
government’s employees to adequately supervise
the community service probationer was the cause
of the injury. That person would be aided by both
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, and the Tennessee
Department of Correction Community Service
Participation Agreement with Supervising Agency.
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, in a left-handed fashion,
creates a statutory duty on the part of local
governments to protect and supervise community
service probationers. The Agreement, in clear and
unmistakable terms, thrusts the responsibility
for their protection and supervision on the user.
The user agrees, among other things, to accept
complete responsibility for “All supervision of every
defendant who does work for my agency through
this agreement” (Paragraph 2). In addition, the
Agreement provides that:
IN CONSIDERATION, for participating in the
Work Project Program, the supervising
agency accepts full responsibility for the
supervision of all defendants assigned to the
agency. Should the supervising agency desire
to be insured against any risk associated with
the program, it is the supervising agency’s
responsibility to obtain and pay for such
insurance coverage.
Other provisions in the Agreement give written
notice to local governments that community service
probationers can represent supervisory problems.
That notice probably creates a correspondingly

high supervisory duty on the part of the local
government (especially Paragraph 10), a duty that is
easy to carelessly breach.
But what about the insulation from liability given
to local governments which use community service
probationers under T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9? That
insulation is triggered only if the local government
exercised “due care” in the protection and
supervision of the community service probationer.
Under Tennessee tort law, “due care” and “ordinary
care” are synonymous, and the lack of due (ordinary)
care, under the circumstances, is negligence.4
The same standard for measuring whether the
conduct of local government employees is
negligent applies to the TGTLA; therefore,
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, offers local governments
no more insulation against claims of injuries
suffered at the hands of community service
probationers than they already have under the
TGTLA. Any insulation T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9,
appears to create is an illusion.
Local government employees using community
service probationers have written notice of their
supervisory and protective responsibilities under
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, and the Community
Service Participation Agreement with Supervising
Agency. But the Agreement also provides local
government employees written notice of something
their common experience and good sense should
have already told them: Some of the probationers
may not be upstanding citizens. Due or ordinary
care under those circumstances probably dictates a
higher duty on the part of the local government’s
employees to supervise and protect them than they
would generally have with respect to other classes
of persons, including fellow employees.
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Tort Liability for Injuries to
Community Service Probationers
Because community service probationers are not
employees, local governments responsible for their
control and supervision could be held liable under
the TGTLA for injuries probationers suffer in the
performance of community service work. There
appears to be nothing in that act that provides
local governments any more protection against
claims of injury from such persons than they have
against similar claims from members of the general
public. In fact, T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, gives the
community service probationer the advantage of
a statute that points to a duty on the part of the
local government to supervise and protect him
from injury.
An additional source of duty to protect the
community service offender is the Department
of Correction Community Service Participation
Agreement with Supervising Agency. The previous
section demonstrated that a local government
signing that agreement accepts written
responsibility for the supervision of community
service probationers. Some of the provisions of that
agreement also impose a responsibility on the local
government to protect them. Everything considered,
the agreement is arguably more concerned with
their protection than with injuries they may cause
third parties. The participating agency has the
responsibility, among other things, for “Seeing that
all supervisors require defendants to wear safety
devices as the situation may require” (Paragraph 7),
and “Seeing that no task which would reasonably
endanger the life or safety of the defendant is
assigned to any defendant” (Paragraph 8).
The most likely sources of liability under the act
for injuries to community service probationers
are negligent acts or omissions of the local
government’s employees (T.C.A. 29-20-205) and the
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negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the local
government’s employees (T.C.A. 29-20-202).
For example, a community service probationer
injured by a wrench carelessly dropped on his foot,
or in a trafﬁc accident in a vehicle driven by a
local government employee, could sue the local
government under the TGTLA the same as any other
member of the general public.
Under T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, a local government
is not liable for injuries caused or suffered by
a community service probationer as long as
it exercises “due care” in the supervision and
protection of the probationer. But as the previous
section pointed out, “due care” is the same
ordinary negligence standard that applies to the
TGTLA. T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9 provides no
additional protection to the local government
defending the suit brought by the community
service probationer injured by the dropped wrench
or in the trafﬁc accident.
A community service probationer injured while
performing community service work for a local
government enjoys a peculiar advantage over a local
government employee injured in the performance
of his job: The probationer may recover under
the TGTLA while the employee may recover only
under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law.
As the next section points out, the community
service probationer’s recovery under the TGTLA
may signiﬁcantly exceed the municipal employee’s
recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act, even
for identical injuries. But an advantage the employee
enjoys under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
Act is that his own negligence causing or contributing to the injury will not bar his recovery. The
community service probationer’s own negligence
causing or contributing to his injury may, in some
circumstances, bar his recovery under the TGTLA.
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Workers’ Compensation Liability for
the Community Service Probationer
Recovery by community service probationers under
the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act
(T.C.A. 50-6-101 et seq.) for injuries sustained
in the performance of community service work
is apparently foreclosed by that law’s deﬁnition
of an employee. T.C.A. 50-6-102(2)(a) deﬁnes
an “employee” for the purpose of worker’s
compensation coverage as:
Every person, including a minor, whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed, the
president, any vice-president, secretary,
treasurer, or other executive ofﬁcer of
a corporate employer without regard to
the nature of the duties of such corporate
ofﬁcials, in the service of an employer, as
employer is deﬁned in subdivision (a)(3),
under any contract of hire or apprenticeship,
written or implied…
The key to the above deﬁnition is the phrase
“under any contract of hire or apprenticeship,
written or implied…” There is no contract of
hire or apprenticeship in the local governmentcommunity service probationer relationship. In
a 1978 opinion, the California Ofﬁce of the Attorney
General opined that an adult criminal defendant who
elects to perform community service in exchange
for probation in lieu of being jailed or ﬁned, has
the status of a “volunteer” for the purposes of
California’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Community
service probationers in Tennessee probably have
the same status. They may not be volunteers in the
traditional sense, but they “volunteer” to perform
community service in lieu of other sentencing
alternatives open to them. The question whether
a volunteer was an employee for Tennessee Workers’
Compensation Law purposes arose in Hill v. King, 663
S.W. 2d 435 (Tenn. App. 1983). In that case
a deputy sheriff was killed in the crash of an

airplane piloted by the Robertson County Sheriff
while they were transporting a prisoner from West
Virginia to Robertson County. The deputy’s survivors
sued the sheriff personally, Robertson County, and
an aviation company on various grounds. However,
the issue in this case was the suit against Robertson
County on the alternative grounds that the deputy
was entitled to compensation under the TGTLA,
or under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
Law. The deputy’s survivors appealed the trial
court’s decision that the deputy was an employee
of Robertson County within the meaning of the
Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law. The reason
they objected to the trial court’s decision is that,
in Tennessee, the Workers’ Compensation Law is
the exclusive remedy of an employee against an
employer for on-the-job injuries. If the trial court’s
ruling stood, the right of his survivors to claim
a more generous recovery under the TGTLA would
be extinguished.
In discussing the relationship between the
deputy and Robertson County, the Court of Appeals
found that:
The deceased sustained a unique relationship
with Dan King, Sheriff of Robertson County.
He had been commissioned a deputy sheriff,
had received a pistol and uniform, and was
authorized to serve, process, and transport
prisoners. Each employee of the sheriff was
permitted to eat one meal at the jail during
each tour of duty… Deceased occasionally
ate at the jail while on duty. He was paid no
salary, could work as much or as little as he
chose, and even when scheduled to work, he
was not obliged to report for duty. He was
reimbursed for fuel used and expenses incurred
on ofﬁcial business. He did regularly report
to work; and, when he did, he was subject to
orders exactly as other salaried ofﬁcers were.
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That relationship did not make the deputy an
employee within the meaning of the Workers’
Compensation Law, held the Tennessee Court of
Appeals. The deputy was, “not for hire;” he had
not entered into an “agreement for pay.” Absent
the agreement for hire, even if he got occasional
beneﬁts as an employee, he did not give up his
rights under the common law or the TGTLA. As to
the limited beneﬁts the deputy received, the
court said:
It is possible that a court might stretch
the occasional meal to represent ‘hire’ if
the question were whether or not workers’
compensation were due although this is
extremely doubtful. However, … to impute
or imply a waiver of so serious a right as the
common law to recover full compensation or
the statutory right to recover within the limits
of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, there
must be such real, palpable and substantial
consideration (hire) as would be expected
to induce a reasonable man to give up such
valuable rights. In other words, the law will
not presume that Mr. King sold his birthright
for a mess of pottage.

If the deputy sheriff in Hill was not an employee
for Workers’ Compensation purposes, it is
unlikely that a “volunteer” community service
probationer is an employee, even if he receives
his meals on the job or other minor incidental
employee beneﬁts.

The “mess of pottage” was the relatively small
death beneﬁt payable to the deputy’s survivors
under the Workers’ Compensation Law compared
to the deputy’s “birthright,” the beneﬁts payable
under the TGTLA. While the task will not be
undertaken here, a comparison of the Workers’
Compensation Law’s schedule of beneﬁts and the
damages recovered under the TGTLA will bring
to mind a variety of circumstances under which
a community service probationer is eligible for
a recovery substantially greater than is a comparably
injured local government employee. The community
service offender is no more likely than the volunteer
deputy sheriff to give up “his birthright for a mess
of pottage.”

Section 1983 Liability for
the Conduct of Community
Service Offenders
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Even if the argument is accepted that a community
service probationer is not a volunteer, that he was
coerced to perform community service, it would still
be difﬁcult for him to claim that he is an employee
for workers’ compensation purposes. In the case of
Abram v. Madison County Highway Department, 495
S.W.2d 539 (1973) the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that a prisoner performing compulsory labor
for the county was not an employee within the
meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
Law because his labor was involuntary; he had not
bargained for employment.
In other words, a community service offender is not
an employee within the meaning of the Tennessee
Workers’ Compensation Law whether he is or is not
a volunteer. In neither case has he bargained for
employment or entered a contract for hire.

While the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
is the exclusive route for a tort liability suit against
a local government under Tennessee law, a person
claiming injury arising from the violation of his
civil rights by a local government may sue that
government in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983, as it is commonly called, provides
simply that:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
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any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Since 1978, municipalities have been “persons”
within the meaning of Section 1983. They have
frequently been held liable for the conduct of their
employees, and a few times for the conduct of nonemployees under their control, when such conduct
resulted in the deprivation of a third party’s civil
rights. As far as can be determined, no local
government has been held liable under Section 1983
for the conduct of a community service probationer,
but Section 1983 is broad enough to include such
liability under the right circumstances.
It is not difﬁcult to imagine the right circumstances
involving community service probationers following
the case of Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee,
814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987).5 There the U.S. Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a county could
be held liable under Section 1983 for the murder
of a sixteen year old girl by a jail trusty. The facts
in that case reﬂect incredibly poor judgment on
the part of the sheriff and his deputy in exercising
supervision and control over the trusty. They also
illustrate how easy it is for poor judgment to be
exercised “under color of statute,” and to become
government policy or custom resulting in the
deprivation of constitutional rights for which the
local government can be held liable.
The Sheriff of Dickson County, Tennessee
accepted custody of Charles Hartman, a convicted
burglar, sent to Dickson County by the Tennessee
Department of Correction under a Tennessee statute
that permits counties to contract with the state to

house nondangerous felons (T.C.A. 41-8-101 et seq.).
However, the court of Appeals declared that the
sheriff and his deputy “were on notice that Hartman
was dangerous and had assaulted a young woman in
the past,” and that in the face of that knowledge,6
they gave him frequent unsupervised use of marked
sheriff’s department patrol cars fully equipped with
lights and siren. Hartman used the patrol car to
perform ofﬁcial tasks for the sheriff and another
deputy and for personal tasks.
On one occasion Hartman, under orders of the
deputy, drove the latter to the deputy’s farm several
miles from the Dickson County jail. Hartman did not
reappear at the Dickson County jail until ten hours
later. During his absence he roamed the highways
of Dickson, Houston and Montgomery counties and
stopped several motorists, using the patrol car’s
blue lights. One of the motorists he stopped was
an unfortunate 16-year-old girl whom he kidnapped
and murdered. At one point the Montgomery County
Sheriff’s ofﬁce learned that a Dickson County
sheriff’s car was stopping motorists in Montgomery
County and reported that information to the Dickson
County dispatcher.
The court held that the practice of the sheriff and
his deputy of providing Hartman with a clearly
marked sheriff’s patrol car was action taken under
color of state law, and that:
The defendant’s actions cannot be attributed
to simple inattention or carelessness. Rather,
the defendants consciously established
a policy of allowing trusties to have use of
ofﬁcial patrol cars with seeming indifference
to consequences. The defendants consciously
and voluntarily failed to respond to the
danger presented by Hartman’s use of the car
to stop motorists.
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Such “reckless indifference to the risk posed by
their action” was sufﬁcient to state a claim of
action under Section 1983, said the court.
Generally, cases in which local governments have
been held liable for the conduct of their employees
and non-employees under their control turn upon
the ability of the courts to ﬁnd one or more hiring,
screening, training, supervisory and disciplinary
practices so negligently bad, that the negligence
rises to the level of deliberate unconstitutional
policy or custom on the part of the local
government. Nishiyama demonstrates that the courts
have shown a high degree of ability to ﬁnd such
practices on the part of local governments.
Both the Tennessee Department of Correction and
the county probation department have an obligation
to screen candidates for community service work,
and to regularly inspect each work project to
ensure that the probationer is being properly used
(T.C.A. 41-9-101 and 41-9-201). However, Nishiyama
turned in part on the court’s view that the sheriff
of Dickson County had notice that Hartman was
a dangerous person even though the sheriff only
accepted custody of him from the Tennessee
Department of Correction. That case should warn
local governments that, for purposes of Section
1983 liability, they cannot rely on the screening
of probationers by the Tennessee Department of
Correction or the county probation department.
Local governments may only accept, rather than
select, community service probationers to perform
work projects under T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9,
but the responsibility for determining whom they
have accepted remains in their hands. Every local
government should independently and carefully
screen (and in appropriate cases, reject) every
prospective community service probationer. Many of
them will be relatively minor offenders, but others
may, like Hartman, be ticking time bombs.
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Local governments that use community service
probationers should take seriously the supervisory
requirements the Community Service Participation
Agreement with Supervising Agency imposes on
them, including the record keeping and reporting
requirements. A poor record in this area will be used
against the local government, both by a person
claiming injury by a community service probationer
and by a community service probationer claiming
injury. In either case, poor record keeping may be
evidence of inadequate supervision and protection
of the community service probationer.
Some local governments attempt to reduce
the liability risks in the community service
probationer program by requiring community
service probationers to sign a waiver of claims
before starting to work. Generally, by signing
such a waiver, the community service probationer
releases the local government from all claims for
injuries or damages the probationer may suffer while
performing community service work. There are two
serious problems with such waivers.
First, it is questionable whether an “exculpatory
contract” executed by a community service
probationer is enforceable. Even if the community
service probationer is a volunteer, it is the coercive
power of the court to jail or ﬁne the defendant
which leads him to “volunteer” for community
service as a condition of probation. The community
service probationer is in a severely unequal
bargaining position respecting his labor.
Oddly enough, the same lack of “bargaining for hire”
that defeats any claim that the community service
probationer is an employee, may make such a
waiver unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
(See Olsen v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 [Tenn. 1977]).
Even if that barrier is jumped, the left-handed
statutory duty local governments owe under
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, to use “due care” in the
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protection and supervision of community service
probationers might override any waiver signed by
the probationer.
Second, the waiver cannot be made effective
against a person suing the local government under
the TGTLA or Section 1983 for injury at the hands
of a community service probationer. The best that
a waiver could do is waive the community service
probationer’s claims against the local government.
It is obvious that no matter what the source of
potential liability of the local government in the
use of community service probationers, the local
government can minimize the risk of liability by
using caution in screening them; assigning them to
jobs in which the potential for injury to them and
to others is small; adopting and enforcing clear,
written policies governing the scope and conditions
of their labor and their relations with the public and
employees; and closely supervising and protecting
them. The local government should also contact
its insurance carrier to determine the extent of its
coverage for injuries caused by and to community
service probationers.
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APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION – DIVISION OF PROBATION
COMMUNITY SERVICE PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT WITH SUPERVISING AGENCY*
THE UNDERSIGNED AGENCY HAS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAM
IN EXCHANGE FOR LABOR TO BE DONE FOR THE AGENCY AT NO COST TO THE AGENCY. ANY FAILURE BY THE AGENCY TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDERS,
RULES OR REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION MAY RESULT IN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY FROM THE PROGAM. THE
FOLLOWING IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED:
1. I, __________ , as the representative of the supervising agency participating in the Work Project Program understand that I am
responsible for:
2. All supervision of every defendant who does work for my agency through this program;
3. For all records required by the coordinator;
4. Making sure that the supervisor’s log and the defendant’s time sheet are kept on a daily basis;
5. Seeing that injuries incurred with defendants are reported immediately to the coordinator;
6. Notifying all supervisors working with defendants that any supervisor falsifying any records or showing favoritism toward any
defendant could result in termination from the program;
7. Seeing that all supervisors require defendants to wear safety devices as a situation may require;
8. Seeing that no task which would reasonably endanger the life or safety of the defendant is assigned to any defendant;
9. Seeing that appropriate work receipts are issued at the end of each day to each defendant and appropriate duplicates are maintained
for the defendants;
10. Seeing that any problems from defendants are reported immediately to the coordinator. Such problems may include, but are not
limited to: (a) uncooperativeness, (b) tardiness, (c) possession of any weapon, (d) possession or use of any narcotics, alcohol or
drugs, (e) use of profanity, (f) dangerous horseplay;
IN CONSIDERATION, for participating in the Work Project Program the supervising agency accepts full responsibility for the
supervision of all defendants assigned to the agency. Should the supervising agency desire to be insured against any risk associated with the
program, it is the supervising agency’s responsibility to obtain and pay for such insurance coverage.
The undersigned individual, signing in behalf of the supervising agency, hereby acknowledges that I have the authority to bind
the supervising agency to the terms of the agreement; I agree to abide by the terms of this agreement; the agreement has been adequately
explained to me; I understand the full consequences if the agency should not comply with this agreement; and I acknowledge receiving a copy
of this agreement.
SUPERVISING AGENCY:
BY:
DATE:
COORDINATOR:
*This is a reproduction. Contact Department of Correction, Division of Probation for original.
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ENDNOTES
1. Under T.C.A., Section 40-35-303, a defendant is
eligible for probation if the sentence imposed is
eight (8) years or less, with some exceptions for
certain crimes [1989 Criminal Sentencing
Reform Act].
2. There is probably no authority under Tennessee
law for a municipal court to “sentence” ordinance
violators to community service as a condition
of probation or for that matter, even to put
municipal ordinance violators on probation.
Note: Since this report was ﬁrst published in
1989, The General Assembly has authorized
municipal offenders (T.C.A. 41-3-107) and
juvenile offenders (T.C.A. 37-1-131(a)(7)) to
be sentenced to community service work.
These statutes provide the municipality using
municipal and juvenile offenders the same
immunity discussed in the body of this report
that applies to the use of probationers.
3. T.C.A. 41-9-104, which applies to probationers
supervised by the Tennessee Department
of Correction, insulates charitable
organizations and governmental entities
authorized to utilize probationer labor under
T.C.A. 41-9-102. T.C.A. 41-9-102(a) authorizes
“any charitable organization or governmental
entity within a judicial circuit” to utilize
such labor. That authority, standing alone,
undoubtedly includes municipalities within
the judicial circuit. But T.C.A. 41-9-102(c)
also provides that any qualiﬁed charitable
organization, or “any agency, branch,
department or other entity of municipal, county
or state government” may apply to the project
coordinator of the judicial circuit where the work
project is to be performed for probationer labor.

T.C.A. 41-9-204, which applies to probationers
supervised by the county probation department,
in similar language insulates charitable
organizations, and, speciﬁcally, municipalities,
counties and political subdivisions authorized
by T.C.A. 41-9-102 to utilize probationer labor.
4. See Street v. National Broadcasting Company,
512 F.Supp. 398 (E.D.Tenn. 1977). Also see 19
TENNESSEE JURISPRUDUENCE, Negligence, see. 2.
If T.C.A. Title 41, Chapter 9, creates a statutory
duty on the part of local governments to protect
and supervise community service probationers,
the breach of that duty may also constitute
negligence per se.
5. Since this report was ﬁrst published in 1989,
court rulings have undermined the basis for the
decision in Nishiyama. It is not clear, however,
whether a different result would be dictated by
these later cases. It is clear that the issues in
Nishiyama would have to be analyzed under a
different constitutional standard today. Applying
a different standard does not guarantee a
different result, especially given the egregious
facts in the case.
After the Sixth Circuit decided Nishiyama,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Deshaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed. 2d 249
(1989) and Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed. 2d 261
(1992). These cases stand for the proposition
that negligence or gross negligence–similar to
that relied on in Nishiyama–would not now be
enough to create government liability under the
Due Process Clause. DeShaney involved a father
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who beat his child until the child suffered brain
damage and became profoundly retarded. The
workers in the Department of Social Services
failed to protect the child. The court held:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against private actors. 489 U.S. 195.
Harker Heights involved a city worker who was
asphyxiated after going into a sewer. His widow
charged that the city failed to train him on
the dangers of sewers. The court held that the
Due Process Clause does not create a duty to
provide a safe workplace and reiterated part of
the reasoning in DeShaney that the Due Process
Clause was intended to prevent the government
from abusing its power and using it as an
instrument of oppression.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, we would
have had to use a test other than the one
we did use. 34 F.3d 350.
Would the different shades of meaning in the
different tests (gross negligence v. intentional
acts or deliberate indifference) lead to a
different result in Nishiyama today? Good
arguments can be made on both sides, but
it is difﬁcult to envision a court leaving the
Nishiyama family without remedy given the facts
of that case.
6. It is not clear in this case either at the District
Court or Court of Appeals level whether the
sheriff and his deputy actually had access to
Hartman’s records, which apparently indicated
his prior assault upon a woman.

In Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856
(6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit tried to explain
what the present standard for liability is under
the substantive Due Process Clause. According
to the court, intentional inﬂiction of injury
by the government or government action
that is arbitrary in the constitutional sense
is necessary. What action is arbitrary in the
constitutional sense is not well deﬁned but
apparently means deliberate indifference or
something like the old “shocks the conscience”
substantive due process standard.
In Lewellen v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, 34 F.3d 345
(6th Cir. 1994), the court stated:
Regardless of whether the result we reached
in Nishiyama could be justiﬁed under
current Supreme Court doctrine, it is clear
that if Nishiyama had come before us after
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
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